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etworks are hot. The
Internet has made it pos-
sible to observe and mea-
sure linkages
representing relationships of








systems, oil pipelines, orga-
nizational networks, power
grids, social structures, trans-
portation, voice communica-
tion, water supply, Web
URLs, and more.
Several fields are collabo-
rating on the development of
network theory, measurement,
and mapping: mathematics
(graph theory), sociology (net-
works of influence and communi-
cation), computing (Internet), and
business (organizational net-
works). This convergence has pro-
duced useful results for risk
assessment and reduction in com-
plex infrastructure networks,
attacking and defending networks,
protecting against network con-
nectivity failures, operating busi-
nesses, spreading epidemics
(pathogens as well as computer
viruses), and spreading innova-
tion. Here, I will survey the fun-
damental laws of networks that
enable these results.
Defining a Network
A network is usually defined as a
set of nodes and links. The nodes
represent entities such as persons,
machines, molecules, documents,
or businesses; the links represent
relationships between pairs of
entities. A link can be directed
(one-way relationship) or undi-
rected (mutual relationship). A
hop is a transition from one node
to another across a single link
separating them. A path is a series
of hops. Networks are very gen-
eral: they can represent any kind
of relation among entities.
Some common network
topologies (interconnection pat-
terns) have their own names:
clique or island (a connected sub-
network that may be isolated
from other cliques), hierarchical
network (tree structured), hub-
and-spoke network (a special
node, the hub, connected directly
to every other node), and multi-
hub network (several hubs con-
nected directly to many nodes).
Some network topologies are
planned, such as the electric grid,
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the air traffic system; others are
unplanned. In his seminal papers
about the Internet, Paul Baran
proposed that a planned, distrib-
uted network would be more
resilient to failures than a hub-
and-spoke network.
A host of physical systems eas-
ily fit a network model. Perhaps
less obvious is that human social
networks also fit the model. The
individuals of an organization are
linked by their relationships—
who emails whom, who seeks
advice from whom, or who influ-
ences whom. Software tools such
as InFlow and Netform are used
by organizations to map their
social networks and identify indi-
viduals that serve critical net-
working roles. Three roles are
prominent: the hub, a person
with links to many others; the
broker (or gatekeeper), a person
who is the only connection
between cliques; the bridge (or
pulsetaker), a person who links
several cliques and can see oppor-
tunities for exchange between
them. Such structures are not vis-
ible in the hierarchical organiza-
tion chart, which maps only the
structure of authority to make
declarations.
It should be no surprise that
physical communication net-
works inherit connections from
social networks. The structure of
links in the Web reflects individ-
ual perceptions of the most useful
information. The structure of
connections among Internet
routers reflects individual choices
for the shortest, fastest connec-
tions to the sites with the most
valuable data. This is where the
convergence of social networking
and physical networking is the
most apparent.
Vast Networks
There has been considerable
interest in networks containing
thousands or millions of nodes.
These networks are so large and
complex that it is hard to even
draw accurate maps of them. The
Internet is the first vast network to
be mapped and carefully measured.
Statistical sampling must be used
because it is impossible to measure
every node. Bill Cheswick has
created beautiful Internet maps
from sampled “trace-route” data
(traceroute is a tool that returns the
IP addresses on a path from a
sender to any Internet address; see
research.lumeta.com/ches/map/).
Others collect Internet statistics by
sampling routing tables and mea-
suring the numbers of direct con-
nections from a router to others.
These statistics yield surprising
insights into basic networking
questions of wide interest: What
is the longest connection path in a
vast network? How fast can an
epidemic or an idea spread in a
network? Do vast networks have
hubs or are their connections
more uniformly distributed?
What is the effect of a random
failure on the connectivity of the
remaining nodes? Can an attacker
splinter the network with a
focused attack? How should a
defender protect the network?
Vast, random networks were
first studied by the mathemati-
cians Paul Erdos and Alfred
Renyi in a series of eight famous
papers published between 1959
and 1968 [6]. In their model,
links are randomly placed among
a fixed set of nodes. The proba-
bility distribution of the number
of links at a node has a bell-
shaped curve centered on the
mean number of links. When the
average number of links is less
than 1, there is a high probability
that the network is a set of dis-
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connected islands; but if the aver-
age is 1 or greater, the entire net-
work is connected. This model
stood for many years as the “gold
standard” for random networks.
But when researchers started
measuring the connection distrib-
utions of real networks they
found that the actual distribu-
tions do not match those pre-
dicted by Erdos. Instead they
found that the probability of k
links at a node is proportional to
(1/k)p, where the power p is typi-
cally 2 to 3. This distribution is
confirmed experimentally because
the plot of the number of occur-
rences of nodes with exactly k
links versus k on log-log paper
yields a straight line of slope -p. It
is called a power-law distribution.
A power-law distribution docu-
ments a system in which the great
majority of nodes have very few
connections, but a very few nodes
have a great many connections. 
In contrast, the random model
predicts that very high connectiv-
ity is exceedingly rare and
unlikely to be observed at all. A
power-law distribution has no
humps that would identify that
some degrees of connection are
preferred over others. Power-law
distributions have extremely large
(or infinite) standard deviations,
which means that no confidence
can be placed in a prediction of
the connectivity of any node sam-
pled at random. The number of
nodes of connectivity 2k is a fixed
fraction (1/2p) of the number of
connectivity k. For these reasons,
networks with power-law connec-
tion statistics are called scale-free
networks.
Scale-free networks are com-
mon [1–4]. The relation between
earthquakes and their Richter
magnitudes is scale-free with p=2.
The distribution of the numbers
of Hollywood actors who starred
in the same films is scale-free
with p=2.3. The Web is scale-free
with p=2.1 to 2.4. Journal cita-
tions are scale-free with p=3. The
electric power grid is scale-free
with p=4. The term scale-free has
also been applied to fractals,
which are structures whose com-
ponents are similar to the overall
structure.
Properties of Scale-Free 
Networks
What are the base conditions that
make a network scale-free? Albert-
Laszlo Barabasi says there are two:
• Growth: new nodes appear at
random times; and 
• Preferential attachment: a new
node connects to an existing
node with probability propor-
tional to the number of connec-
tions already at that node [1–3]. 
In other words, well-connected
nodes tend to attract more con-
nections than poorly connected
nodes. Any network meeting
these two conditions will evolve
into a scale-free state. The phrase
“evolve into” is often stated “self-
organize into” because there is
no outside agent forcing the
organization. The amazing fact
that so many different kinds of
networks are scale free is
explained by growth and prefer-
ential attachment. Why most of
them have p between 2 and 3 is
still an open question.
With this model, the oldest
nodes will be the most con-
nected, a condition called first
market advantage. However, it is
not always true that the first-
comers are the most connected.
Newcomer Google took over as a
major hub in the Web because it
offered more value than other
search engines. When he modi-
fied his attachment rule so that
preference depends both on an
arbitrary preference constant as
well as connectivity, Barabasi
found the networks are still
scale-free [1, 3].
Since these conditions are true
of social networks, large social
networks tend to be scale-free.
Communication networks set up
within these social networks fol-
low the social communication
patterns and tend also to be 
scale-free.
Scale-free networks have a
small diameter (maximum dis-
tance between two nodes); the
Web’s diameter is 19 [1, 2]. Some
networks are not scale-free, but
their diameters are still small.
Small-world networks were first
discovered by Stanley Milgram in
his famous postal experiment in
1967, when he found that letters
addressed only to a name would
find their way to the recipient
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within six hops. The phrase “six
degrees of separation” comes from
this work [8, 10].
Vulnerabilities
A node failure means that any
path through that node is unus-
able; it’s as though the node and
its links were deleted from the
network. In some networks, a
node failure might divide the net-
work into two or more discon-
nected pieces—for example, on
losing a broker or gatekeeper in a
social network. In others, a ran-
dom node failure would not
affect overall connectivity—for
example, the Internet “routes
around damage.” The properties
of scale-free networks tell us two
things about damage caused by
node failures:
Good news: A random node
failure in a scale-free network has
negligible effect on connectivity.
This is because the vast majority
of nodes have only a few connec-
tions; deleting one of them will
hardly be noticed.
Bad news: Failure of a hub in a
scale-free network can significantly
damage the network’s connectivity.
The power law distribution guar-
antees that there will be a small
number of hubs. If one of them is
deleted, a large number of connec-
tions go with it, and that may
cause the network to fragment into
many parts.
Thus an attacker’s strategy will
be to locate and attack the hubs.
Internet denial-of-service attacks
disable a node by overloading it:
deny service at a few hubs and
everyone can be affected.
Conversely, a defender’s strategy
is to harden the hubs. In fact, a
defender will not have sufficient
resources to protect every node in
a vast network. Therefore, protect-
ing the hubs is the best policy.
Viruses spread fast in scale-free
networks because the network
diameter is small. Launch a virus
at any node and within a few
hops it reaches a hub; within a
few more hops it reaches every-
one. Some virus experts believe
that if the network hubs could be
secured successfully against
viruses, most virus problems
would disappear.
Guardians of critical infrastruc-
ture have found that the networks
they protect are scale-free. The
only sound policy is to identify the
hubs of their networks and devote
the limited resources to protecting
them. This can have enormous
payoffs in the reliability and
resilience of the network [7].
Innovations
As I have discussed in previous
columns, innovations are trans-
formations of practice within
communities [5]. How do inno-
vations propagate?
Innovations propagate through
the social network of the commu-
nity. The idea (or proposal) for a
new practice passes from one
member to another through their
collaboration links. When it
reaches a new member, the idea
will either be rejected, or it will be
adopted and offered to the mem-
ber’s immediate colleagues. Orga-
nization theorists have studied
this with the help of social net-
work maps. Innovations are most
likely to spread if the hubs adopt
and recommend them; brokers
and bridges play important roles
in jumping the idea to new
groups.
Given these dynamics, it is
likely that the “size of an innova-
tion”—the number of people ulti-
mately involved—also follows a
power law. That is, the vast major-
ity of innovations affect only small
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The vast majority of innovations affect only small groups and 
a few affect enormous numbers of people. 
groups and a few affect enormous
numbers of people. Because the
standard deviation of a power law
distribution is very large or infi-
nite, there can be little confidence
in an advance prediction of the
size of an innovation.
That said, the spread of inno-
vations is not as random as the
discussion might make it seem. It
has been well documented that
some people are better at conceiv-
ing and spreading innovations
than others. In a previous col-
umn, I summarized the personal
foundational practices of skilled
innovators [5]. From this we can
infer a few guidelines: 
Locate the hubs of the network
you’re trying to influence. Bring
them on board. That will make it
much easier for many others in the
community to follow suit. Con-
versely, if you pick random indi-
viduals (“cold calls”), the chances
are very high that you will pick a
poorly connected node. Even if
that individual adopts your prac-
tice, it will take a long time to
propagate to others.
Treat the business of spreading
innovations as a skill that improves
over time. As a beginner, start
small. With experience, you can
influence ever-larger communities.
Consortia
Ilkka Tuomi notes that the
biggest innovations of our time—
Internet, Web, Linux—have been
facilitated by open consortia [9].
The purpose of a consortium is to
be a (virtual) meeting place where
engineers can come together to
discuss and reach consensus for
the basic components that enable
them to cooperate, collaborate,
and interoperate. In the IETF
(Internet Engineering Task Force)
and W3C (World Wide Web
Consortium), the basic compo-
nents of interest are data formats
and protocols; in any of the sev-
eral Linux consortia, the basic
components are the software
modules making up Linux. The
key factor is that the consortium
is able to reach agreements with-
out a central authority and with-
out the encumbrances of their
members’ organizational bureau-
cracies. If enough key players
join, the consortium’s recommen-
dations will become de facto stan-
dards that all members and
observers can use.
Viewed from the perspective of
networks, a consortium is a pur-
posefully constructed bridge
between network parts. It
becomes a new hub for distribut-
ing influence.
Distributed Responsibility
Many vast networks have no cen-
tral authority. The responsibility
for taking actions, and for coping
with their consequences, moves
away from hubs and toward the
small groups of the network. Net-
work mechanisms, such as con-
sortia and mediators, help groups
reach agreements and resolve 
disputes.
One of the great challenges of
our age is “network centric opera-
tions,” sometimes also called dis-




work for their communication
and coordination. (The oxy-
moron “network centric”
expresses the tension between the
network’s distributivity and the
tradition of hierarchical com-
mand and control.) Given that
operations are evolving in this
way, a question on the minds of
military officers and CEOs is:
Can a network be commanded?
Military doctrine offers a clear
answer: it’s called commander’s
intent. The commander expresses
strategic intent of an operation
and leaves the details of how to
accomplish it to local units. The
coordination is maintained by a
lot of communication between
commander and local units. All
units know the intent and work
on it autonomously. They feed
their results back to the comman-
der, who coalesces them into new
strategies and new intents. The
same model applies in many large
companies.
Using a military example, the
early operations in Afghanistan
were conducted by Special Opera-
tions Forces, which consisted of
many highly decentralized local
units commanded by captains and
majors. The units knew the intent
of their operations, but had full
authority to define and execute
local actions. They were able to
blend with the community, get
intelligence, and track down ene-
mies. Later, the full military
brought with it the centralizing
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM November  2004/Vol. 47, No. 11 19
tendencies of hierarchical com-
mand, taking authority back from
the captains and majors, and slow-
ing military progress considerably.
Perhaps the most difficult les-
son for a commander or CEO is
to leave the network alone after
the intent is communicated and
the right people chosen for the
local units. The commander has
to be willing to trust the local
units and not try to “microman-
age” them. The commanders and
CEOs who have practiced this
have consistently wound up with
the most successful, effective,
agile, and innovative networks.
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